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INTRODUCTION

The increased cost of competent legal representation, I busy court
dockets,2 and potentially large economic liability3 have combined to
provide an overwhelming incentive to avoid extensive patent litigation.
An effective technique for reducing the economic costs to both parties
is the establishment of a licensing agreement or some other form of
alternative dispute resolution. 4 When these fail, strong policy reasons
exist to deny rewarding a party whose action, or lack of action, unfairly
harms the adversary, even where a solid legal basis exists that would
normally entitle the party to such a reward. 5 Courts have long recognized a need for fair and equitable results to disputes.
Equitable defenses in patent litigation, as in most legal arenas,
provide a means to completely escape, or at a minimum reduce liability.
Although these defenses are available during litigation, their true power
rests in a motion for summary judgment, or as leverage to force some
form of alternative dispute resolutions. Laches and estoppel are the
two primary equitable defenses an alleged patent infringer can invoke. 6
Section I of this article explores the origins of these two equitable
doctrines and their development in the field of patent infringement
litigation. In particular, this section discusses the historical application
of laches by the Supreme Court and federal courts. Section II discusses
1. Tom Arnold & Willem G. Schuurman, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Intellectual Property Cases, 321 PAT. LrrIo. 437, 443 (1991) ("Then there is the money.
One million dollars per party for a patent trial and appeal is now routine - two to

five million and more, not uncommon.").

2. "[T]he average time, from filing a patent infringement suit to final appellate
determination, is more than a third of the patent's seventeen year life." Id. at 442.
3. In 1979, Honeywell Inc. filed suit against Minolta Camera Co. claiming it
was owed $174 million in royalties and triple damages for intentional patent infringement. Minolta challenged the validity of Honeywell's patents. Honeywell, Inc. v.
Minolta Camera Co., No. CIV.A.87-4847, CIV.A.88-1624, 1991 WL 50063 (D.N.J.
Apr. 5, 1991). After a lengthy trial, the jury awarded $96 million in damages. See J.
Stratton Shartel, The Changing Litigation Landscape: Three Winning Uses of Technology, 6 No. 5 INSIDE Lrri. 1, 28 (1992).
4. See generally Donald W. Banner, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 300 PAT.
LrrIo. 205 (1990) (advocating alternative approaches to litigation); Arnold & Schuurman, supra note 1.
5. While it is inequitable for an infringer to deprive a patent owner of its rights,
it is equally inequitable for the patent owner to lead the infringer to make large
investments believing the patent rights will not be pressed. Potash Co. of Am. v.
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 213 F.2d 153, 156 (10th Cir. 1954).
6. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.01, at 19-4 to 19-5 (perm. ed. rev.
vol. 1992) (listing the major defenses in patent infringement cases: patent invalidity,
fraudulent procurement, patent misuse, and equitable laches or estoppel).

PA TENT LITIGATION

1993:3351

the recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("Federal Circuit") in A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co. 7 and focuses on this case's impact on both laches and estoppel.
Section III discusses the ramifications of the Federal Circuit's adoption
of a "bursting bubble" theory for patent infringement. This section
concludes that by rejecting the former laches analysis, the Federal
Circuit has effectively eliminated the use of laches as a basis for
summary judgment. Section III supports the changes that the Federal
Circuit has made in equitable estoppel and agrees that estoppel has
been correctly returned to a position where the focus is on the patent
owner's communications and not the passage of time.

I.
A.

PRE-AUKERMAN EQUITABLE DEFENSES

LACHES

The general application of the doctrine of laches is based on the
theory that equity should favor those who assert their rights and not
those who "sleep" on them.9 Laches is defined as a neglect to assert a
right or claim which, when taken together with a lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to an adverse party.' 0 This inaction can operate to bar the recovery of damages."
Furthermore, historically, "[n]othing can call forth .... [a court
of equity] into activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable
diligence; where these are wanting, the Court is passive, and does
nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced .... 12 The
7. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
8. Although the Federal Circuit has changed both laches and estoppel, the
changes made to laches will have a considerable and controversial impact on litigation.
Therefore, the defense of laches will dominate this comment.
9. Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1877) (denying relief for
collateral property sold by the bank based on four-year delay in filing suit).
10. See id.; see also Wooded Shores Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Mathews,
345 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
11. Although recognizing the need to bar stale claims, the Supreme Court also
recognized the need to prevent future infringement of plaintiffs' rights. McLean v.
Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 257 (1877). In patent litigation, laches prohibits the recovery of
damages prior to the complaint but does not preclude the granting of an injunction to
prevent future infringement. See 5 Cmsum, supra note 6, § 19.05, at 19-389 to 19-399.
"Relief of [damages] is constantly refused, even where the right of the party to an
injunction is acknowledged because of an infringement, as in the case of acquiescence
or want of fraudulent intent." McLean, 96 U.S. at 257.
12. Smith v. Clay, 29 Eng. Rep. 743, 744 (1767) (concluding that a 20-year delay
barred a judicial review).
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Supreme Court, embracing these principles Lord Camden articulated
in 1767,13 stated that "equity has adopted the principle that the delay
which will defeat a recovery must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case.' ' 4 However, when laches is asserted as a defense,
the plaintiff is measured against the standard of knowledge that a
person of ordinary intelligence would have obtained upon inquiry. 5
Equity does not favor one party. Equity requires the court to
balance the rights and interests of all parties in light of the values held
important by society. "Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on
flexibility.' 1 6 Therefore, if the party asserting laches as a defense is
guilty of fraudulent conduct, the mere lapse of time may not prevent
recovery. 17

In light of the general principles behind a defense of laches, the
following two sections describe the elements of a laches defense in
patent litigation and some of the available excuses the patentee can
assert to overcome laches.
1. Elements of Laches
Prior to A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co.,
the assertion of laches as a defense in patent litigation required the
defendant to prove two essential elements: (1) plaintiff's unreasonable
and inexcusable delay in asserting a claim and (2) material prejudice to
the defendant as a result of plaintiff's delay. 8 These elements were
fundamentally the same as those set forth by the Supreme Court in its
earliest decisions. 19
Laches was an affirmative defense; therefore, the party asserting
20
it theoretically had the burden of proof as to each of the two elements.
13. Id.; see also Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875); Marsh v.
Whitmore, 88 U.S. 178 (1874); Badger v. Badger, 69 U.S. 87 (1864).
14. Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U.S. 611, 618 (1877).
15. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogart, 250 U.S. 483, 500 (1919) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting) ("Rational men are presumed to know the law; knowledge of consequent
rights and appropriate means of asserting them is necessarily implied from full
acquaintance with the facts."); see also Johnson v. Standard Mining Co., 148 U.S.
360, 370 (1893) ("[W]here the question of laches is in issue, the plaintiff is chargeable
with such knowledge as he might have obtained upon inquiry .. .

16. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
17. Id.
18. Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
19. For an explanation of the theory behind laches see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
20. Leinoff, 726 F.2d at 741; Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc.,
839 F.2d 1544, 1552 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
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However, the presence of certain facts often allowed the court to
presume the burden of proof had been met. 21 Finally, the overall
protection afforded the defendant by laches was a limitation of liability
solely for post-filing damages. 22
a.

Unreasonable Delay

One of the essential requirements of a laches defense was an
unreasonable delay by the patentee in prosecuting a claim.23 The
establishment of what constituted an "unreasonable" delay was traditionally left to the trial court. 24 However, equitable practice customarily
adopted the time limit of a comparable statute of limitations to establish
the time at which a presumption of laches existed.2 This threshold time
limit in patent litigation was six years from the time the specific acts
of infringement were known, or should have been known, by the
patentee.26 Therefore, if a patentee failed to file suit enforcing its claims
within six years of its discovery, the court presumed the delay was
27
unreasonable.
When the court allowed the presumption of laches, difficult issues
of evidentiary procedure had to be resolved. 28 The majority view until
21. "[A] 6-year delay is presumptively an unreasonable one for filing a patent
infringement suit .... [F]urthermore [it] is presumptively injurious to the infringer.
The infringer does not need ...to produce any additional evidence of prejudice."
Leinoff, 726 F.2d at 741-42.
22. Id. at 741 ("Laches, if proven, does not preclude a patent infringement
action. It has, for example, no effect on an action for post-filing damages or an
injunction. It simply bars the recovery of all pre-filing damages.").
23. "[T]he rule is to withhold relief where there has been unreasonable delay in
prosecuting a claim .

. . ."

Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,

284 F. 645, 650 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 623 (1923) (quoting Prince's
Metallic Paint Co. v. Prince Mfg. Co., 57 F. 938 (3d Cir. 1893)).
24. Laches must be determined by the facts of each case. Therefore, a three-year
delay can constitute laches. Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d
1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
25. Leinoff, 726 F.2d at 741.
26. "The only statutory time limitation on patent infringement action is set forth
in 35 U.S.C. § 286, which provides that one cannot recover damages for any
infringement committed more than 6 years before the filing of a complaint." Id.

27. "Because of the 6-year limitation in section 286, . . . a 6-year delay is

presumptively an unreasonable one for filing a patent infringement suit." Id.
28. The question of which party carried the burden of presenting evidence and
the burden of persuasion has to be resolved. "The one asserting a laches defense
normally must prove the unreasonableness of a delay in filing suit." Id. However, the

use of a presumption shifts the burden "to the patent owner ... to prove the existence
and reasonableness of ... an excuse." Id. at 742. Further, the patentee "bears the
additional burden of showing [a] lack of injury to the infringer .... ." Id.
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199229 held that when a presumption of laches was established, "[t]he
burden is then on the patent owner to prove the existence and reasonableness of an excuse for the delay, as well as to show the lack of
prejudice to the infringer."30 Shifting the burden of persuasion 3 to the
patentee provided the accused infringer a means of having the claim
dismissed on summary judgment, diminishing the economic expense of
32

unnecessary litigation.

b.

Material Prejudice

The second element of laches was the existence of material prejudice to the defendant resulting from the patentee's delay.3" A lengthy
delay in filing suit for alleged infringement often detrimentally affected
the defendant's ability to adequately accumulate and present evidence
supporting its non-liability. Some of the specific evidentiary problems
included the loss of documentation, the inaccessibility of witnesses, and
the inaccbracy of the memory of obtainable witnesses.3 4 As such,
29. The change in the court's application of laches will be discussed infra in
section I.
30. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1552 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
When delay in prosecuting a claim is so unusual as to carry with it the
appearance of being unreasonable .

.

. there devolves upon the plaintiff the

burden of disclosing the impediments to an earlier action; of showing, if
ignorant of his rights, how he remained in ignorance so long; and of revealing
how and when he first came to a knowledge of the matters on which he relies
in his bill for relief.
Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 284 F. 645, 650 (3d Cir.
1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 623 (1923).
31. The 'burden of proof' and 'burden of persuasion' will be used interchangeably
throughout this comment to mean an onus on the burdened party to convince the trier
of facts. This is distinguished from the 'burden of going forward with evidence' which
means the party must present evidence to refute or explain.
32. If a patent owner cannot persuade the court that it had a justifiable excuse
for a lengthy delay, further litigation would be a waste of valuable resources. See
Adelberg Lab., Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 921 F.2d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding summary
judgment for the infringer). The court states that "Adelberg has not rebutted the
presumption that the delay was unreasonable by showing an acceptable excuse for the
delay." Id. at 1272. Because Adelberg's failure to assert its rights for 11 years was
unexcused, it "must suffer the consequences of that inaction." Id. at 1271-72.
33. "Mere delay is not sufficient; there must be disadvantage to another."
Technitrol, Inc. v. Memorex Corp., 376 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 513
F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1975).
34. Potash Co. v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 213 F.2d 153, 160
(10th Cir. 1954) (stating that a 10-year delay resulted in lost witnesses, missing
documents and memory loss).
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material prejudices in the form of evidentiary obstacles were often
3
accepted as fulfilling the second element of laches .
Along with evidentiary obstacles, some courts also recognized
economic prejudice to the defendant as fulfilling the requirement of
material prejudice. Economic prejudice commonly occurred when the
alleged infringer had invested substantial amounts of money and capital
into business operations encompassing the patent in question. 36 However, many courts viewed this type of disadvantage as a business risk
the defendant took and, therefore, one which could not be used to bar
37
the patentee's assertion of its rights.
Regardless of actual prejudice, a delay in filing suit by more than
six years was presumed to be injurious to the defendant.38 In addition
to the presumption of prejudice, a long delay shifted the burden to the
patentee to show a lack of prejudice to the defendant.3 9
Even though the two elements of laches were independent, the
presumption of material prejudice was only available where the delay
was unreasonable. 4 Consequently, the patentee could destroy both
presumptions by establishing that the delay was excusable. 4' The following section describes many of the excuses that were available to a
patent owner who faced a laches defense.
2. Defenses to the Defense: Excuses for Delay
After the elements of laches were established by either a presumption or through a showing of actual delay or prejudice, the burden of
proof shifted to the patentee to prove that the unreasonable delay in
filing suit was excusable and that the delay did not prejudice the
infringer. 42 In other words, the patentee had to persuade the court that
a finding of laches would be inequitable.
35. See 5 CxsuM, supra note 6, § 19.05, at 19-443.
36. Id. at 19-444 n.64.1.
37. See Jenn-Air Corp. v. Penn Ventilator Co., 464 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1972)
(holding that continuing business is not economic prejudice as a result of the delay).
38. Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
39. Id.
40. See Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 777, 789 (Cl.
Ct. 1989) (holding that an excuse for the delay is sufficient to rebut presumption of
laches), aff'd, 897 F.2d 539 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
41. This policy is questionable, as an excuse for the delay merely attacks the
reasonableness of the delay element, and does not change the prejudicial effect the
delay had on the defendant. See 5 Cinsum, supra note 6, § 19.05[2], at 19-449 to 19450.
42. See Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 284 F. 645, 651
(3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 623 (1923).
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The most common excuse invoked by patentees was that they were
unable to enforce their rights due to involvement in other litigation.43
As a result of the expense of litigation, patent owners often were not
44
required to litigate against all potential infringers simultaneously.
However, the involvement in related litigation did not automatically
excuse the delay. The patent owner was required to notify the infringer
of its pending litigation and its intent to enforce the patent upon the
45
completion of that litigation to obtain the protection of this excuse.
In addition to defenses based on related litigation, another excuse
used to justify the delay centered around the knowledge of infringement. The mere fact that a patentee lacked personal knowledge of an
infringement was not adequate to excuse a failure to file a timely
claim. 46 Even though the patentee may have believed that the infringement had ceased, the lack of actual knowledge was not an adequate
excuse if reasonable inquiry would have revealed the continuing infringement. 4 But if the patentee could not acquire knowledge of
infringement through reasonable diligence, the presumption might have
been destroyed." In addition, the inability of patent owners to assert
43. 5 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.05[2] at 19-425.
44. See Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Sawyer-Man Elec. Co., 53 F. 592, 597 (2d
Cir. 1892) (stating litigation is expensive and all interested parties must have been aware
of ongoing litigation), cert. denied, 149 U.S. 785 (1893).
45. "[T]o excuse delay based on other litigation, the patentee must give notice
to the alleged infringer of the existence of other litigation and of an intent to enforce
its rights

. .

." Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. 839 F.2d 1544, 1553

(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988); see also Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp.,
833 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding adequate notice was not given by the
patent owner); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless Co., 693 F.2d 697, 700 (7th
Cir. 1982) (stating that notice lets the infringer know that the patent owner has not
acquiesced to the infringement).
46. "[Patentee's] lack of knowledge does not constitute a legally sufficient
'excuse' for his failure to bring a timely action." Lemelson v. Carolina Enters., Inc.,
541 F. Supp. 645, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding defendant did not conceal its
infringement from the patentee).
47. Id.

48. Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 909 F.2d 1495 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Lemelson, 541 F. Supp. at
654 (noting that the infringer did not conceal its infringement); Studiengesellschaft
Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1326 (5th Cir.) (stating that to determine
when the delay began "the Court must look .

.

. to the time at which the plaintiff

knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the defendant's
alleged infringing action"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980). Another court has
stated: "even if [patentee] had no actual knowledge, 'a [patentee] may be barred when
the [infringer's] conduct has been open and no adequate justification for ignorance is
offered."' Ritter v. Rohm & Haas Co., 271 F. Supp. 313, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (quoting
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their rights sooner was advanced as an excuse for the delay. This excuse
was primarily based on the economic consequences of bringing an
infringement suit.
In analyzing these excuses, the overall financial position of the
patent holder bore little weight as a defense to laches. Although
litigation can be financially burdensome, "poverty or pecuniary embarrassment [is] not a sufficient excuse for postponing the assertion of
[one's] rights." ' 49 The patentee is required to assert its rights to the
extent possible by its poverty.50 Regardless of its financial position, if
the patentee is actively pursuing means to enforce its claims, notification
of intent to enforce its rights prior to filing is required." However, a
party may be excused from filing a claim until the litigation is "monetarily ripe.''52 In addition to these excuses, ongoing bilateral negotiations between the parties can prevent the patentee from asserting its
full rights and has had limited success as an excuse for the delay."
Ongoing litigation, lack of knowledge, and an inability to assert a
claim due to economics or negotiation have all been used as an excuse
for lengthy delays. However, even if the patentee could not excuse the
delay based on its action, it could assert that the defendant had acted
Chandon Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 535 (2d Cir.
1964)).
49. Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U.S. 611, 618 (1877); see also Leggett v.
Standard Oil Co., 149 U.S. 287 (1893); Whitman v. Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 263
F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding poverty is no excuse for delay).
50. The patentee in Coleman asserted that:
the delay was due to his inability to find an attorney to prosecute the action,
or to raise the necessary funds. Those excuses are inadequate as a matter of
law. There is no evidence that [patentee] made any protest or assertion of his
rights, even to the limited extent allowed by his poverty.
Coleman v. Corning Glass Works, 619 F. Supp. 950, 954 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (citations
omitted).
51. Id.

52. "[Patentee] could reasonably delay bringing suit until he could determine
that the extent of possible infringement made litigation monetarily ripe." Tripp v.
United States, 406 F.2d 1066, 1071 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (holding delay was justified because
patentee consistently demanded compensation for infringement). Likewise, the financial
position of the infringer may make potential litigation economically unjustifiable until
a later date. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 951, 953 (N.D.
II1. 1989), aff'd, 906 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
53. Compare RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 701 F. Supp. 456, 477 (D. Del.
1988) ("[Patentee's] genuine effort to resolve its dispute with [the infringer] through
negotiations provides a justifiable excuse for the eleven year delay .

. . ."),

aff'd, 887

F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989) with General Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., 304 F.2d 724, 727
(6th Cir. 1962) (holding limited, unilateral communications indicating desire to enter
into an agreement does not justify a long delay).
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in such a manner that equity should disallow a barring of the claim.
If the infringer's conduct was particularly egregious the defense of4
laches would not be allowed based on the "unclean hands" doctrine.1
Such judicial evaluation of the infringer's actions emphasizes the fact
that an equitable defense of laches requires a balancing of the fairness
and reasonableness of both parties' actions. 5 While laches was one
defense available to a patent infringer, another defense based on similar
elements was equitable estoppel. The additional elements required for
an estoppel defense are examined in the following section.
B. ESTOPPEL

The second equitable defense a patent infringer often asserted was
known as equitable estoppel 6 One of the primary differences between
laches and estoppel was the effect on the remedies available to the
patentee. While laches only precluded pre-filing damages, a defense of
estoppel destroyed both past and future claims. 7
Before 1992, 8 both defenses of laches and estoppel required proof
of unreasonable delay and material prejudice to the infringer. Therefore, neither defense was practical unless a substantial period of time
had passed. Unlike laches, the delay required for estoppel was measured
from the time the patentee made misleading statements, not when it
knew of the infringement5 9 Nevertheless,' the first two elements of
estoppel were traditionally established when the elements of laches were
established.6° As a result, all of the characteristics and limitations of
these elements, along with the use of a presumption to establish them,
54. Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1576 (Fed: Cir. 1986) (plagiarizing
the plaintiff's patent showed that the defendant had "unclean hands" and was not
entitled to the defense of laches). The Bott court followed TWM Mfr. Co. v. Dura
Corp., 592 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986), and held that
where a defense of laches would normally exist, proof of egregious conduct by the
infringer changes the equities in favor of the patentee. Bott, 807 F.2d at 1576.
55. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.05[2], at 19-450 to 19-454.
56. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 19.01, at 19-5.
57. See, e.g., Adelberg Lab., Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 921 F.2d 1267, 1272 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("While the defense of laches bars only retrospective relief, the defense of
estoppel totally bars any assertion of the patent claim.").
58. See infra section III.B for a discussion of post-1992 estoppel.
59. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1554 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988). For an explanation of the delay requirements
for laches see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
60. Meyers v. Brooks Shoe, Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
equitable estoppel requires the defendant to show both elements of laches, as well as
affirmative conduct and detrimental reliance).

PA TENT LITIGATION

1993:3351

were as equally applicable for estoppel as they were for laches. 61
In addition to the two elements of laches, estoppel required

affirmative conduct by the patentee which induced the infringer to
believe that the patentee had abandoned its claim and detrimental
reliance by the infringer. 62 These additional two elements have often
eliminated a defense of estoppel even when a defense of laches was
available .

1.

63

Affirmative Conduct

The third element of estoppel required conduct by the patentee
which induced the infringer to believe that the patentee abandoned its
claim. 64 This conduct was considered independent of the patentee's
intention. "Bad faith on the part of the patentee is not ... a requirement of an estoppel defense." '65 Although bad faith was not required,

some affirmative conduct by the patentee was.

Affirmative conduct by the patentee was found to include misrepresentations, acts of misconduct, or intentionally misleading silence. 66
However, silence alone generally did not establish this element of
estoppel. 67 Conduct in excess of mere silence was needed to sustain a
61. See supra section L.A (discussing the elements and excuses for laches).
62. Adelberg Lab., Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 921 F.2d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Young Engineers, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1317 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). Before 1992, equitable estoppel required: (1) unreasonable and inexcusable
delay in filing suit, (2) prejudice to the infringer, (3) affirmative conduct by the patentee
inducing the belief that it abandoned its claims against the alleged infringer, and (4)
detrimental reliance by the infringer. Jamesbury Corp., 839 F.2d at 1553-54.
63. See, e.g., Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Although laches barred the patentee from recovering pre-filing damages, the court
stated that mere silence by more than six years could not have reasonably led the
infringer to believe the patentee abandoned its claim. Id. at 1574. As a result, the court
rejected the defense of estoppel and remanded the case for a consideration of postfiling damages. Id. at 1575.
64. Adelberg, 921 F.2d at 1274. The patentee must make "representations or
engaged in conduct which justifies an inference of abandonment of the patent claim or
which has induced the infringer to believe that its business would be unmolested."
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1330 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).

65. Studiengesellschaft, 616 F.2d at 1330.
66. Adelberg, 921 F.2d at 1273.

67. Naxon Telesign Corp. v. Bunker Ramo Corp., 686 F.2d 1258, 1266 (7th Cir.

1982) ("Delay alone is insufficient to bar a patentee from enforcing his patent ..

..

5 CHIsuM, supra note 6, § 19.05(3], at 19-460.
[N]owhere is it said that there must be a threat of enforcement or an assertion
of rights followed by silence before there can be an estoppel. Indeed, where
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defense of estoppel. 6 Only when the patentee threatened enforcement
and then remained silent for an extended period, did the court69find the
conduct sufficient to support a defense of equitable estoppel.
2. Detrimental Reliance
The final element of estoppel required that the infringer relied
upon the patentee's conduct and that the specific reliance resulted in
detriment to the infringer.70 The infringer need not be convinced that
the patentee abandoned its claim, but reasonably believed that the
claim was abandoned.

7

1

As stated previously, a delay in excess of six years created a
presumption of unreasonable delay, and in some cases a presumption
of prejudice. 2 However, a defendant was not able to use a presumption
to establish detrimental reliance. The defendant had to show it was
actually harmed.73 Harm must be established by a change in the
on the patentee's conduct,
infringer's position resulting from reliance
74
such as investments in manufacturing.
nothing has happened other than silence so misleading that the infringer
believes that the patentee has abandoned its claims, more reason exists for
finding an estoppel than where a threat or an assertion of rights has, in fact,
been explicated.
Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.N.J. 1990).
68. Adelberg, 921 F.2d at 1273; see also Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus.,
726 F.2d 724 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
69. Adelberg, 921 F.2d at 1274 (citing Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d
1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Meyers v. Brooks Shoe, Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("[W]e do not believe that a suggestion of infringement coupled with an
offer to license followed by silence would suffice to establish equitable estoppel.");
Hottel, 833 F.2d at 1573 (stating that affirmative conduct is more than silence alone);
see also 5 Cmsum, supra note 6, § 19.05[3], at 19-460 to 19-461.
70. See supra note 62 for the elements of estoppel.
71. Adelberg, 921 F.2d at 1274; see also Chubb Integrated Sys., Inc. v. National
Bank of Washington, 658 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (D.D.C. 1987) (denying summary
judgment in part because there was a genuine issue as to whether the infringer believed
the patentee abandoned its rights); Southwire Co. v. Essex Group, Inc., 570 F. Supp.
643 (N.D. I11.1983) (holding reliance on counsel was not sufficient).
72. Naxon Telesign Corp. v. Bunker Ramo Corp., 686 F.2d 1258, 1263 (7th Cir.
1982) ("[A] defendant ... cannot automatically shift its burden of demonstrating
prejudice to the plaintiff based on the passage of a set period of time."). Because the
result of estoppel is severe, "a court should not lightly presume injury to the party
raising the defense." Id. at 1264.
73. See Olympia Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. General Elec. Co., 712 F.2d 74, 77
(4th Cir. 1983) ("[Djetriment may not be established on the basis of a presumption . . . ."); see also supra note 71 (requiring belief by the infringer).
74. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1555 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988) (finding detrimental reliance based upon the
investments the infringer made following the patentee's conduct).
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II.

AUKERMAN

V. CHAIDES CONSTRUCTION Co.

The traditional formulation of the defenses of laches and estoppel

in patent litigation were at issue in A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.

Chaides Construction Co. 7 The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the
patent infringer. The Federal Circuit used this opportunity to try to
clarify the application of laches and establish the proper elements of

estoppel in patent litigation. In the process, however, substantial and
possibly unwarranted changes were made to the doctrine.
A.

HISTORY OF THE CASE

Aukerman was the owner of two patents relating to a method and
device for forming concrete highway barriers. 6 The defendant, Chaides

Construction Co. ("Chaides"), purchased a patented slip-form 77 from
Aukerman's licensee in 1979. Upon notification that Chaides had made

such a purchase, Aukerman contacted Chaides in an effort to enter

into a direct license agreement. 71 Over the next two months, the parties
communicated sporadically.7 9 After that, no further communication
occurred until October 1987 and no agreement was ever reached. 80
75. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
76. Id. at 1026.
77. Slip-forms are devices which allow the fabrication of asymmetrical highway
barriers directly onto highway surfaces of different elevations, thereby eliminating the
need for constructing a custom mold. Id. at 1026.
78. "[Clounsel for Aukerman advised Chaides by letter dated February 13, 1979,
that use of the device raised 'a question of infringement with respect to one or more
of [Aukerman's patents-in-suit],' and offered Chaides a license." Id. (quoting the
letter).
79. [L]etters were sent by Aukerman's counsel to Chaides on March 16 and
April 12, 1979. Chaides replied by telephone on April 17, 1979 but was unable
to speak with counsel for Aukerman. By letter of April 24, 1979, Aukerman's
counsel advised Chaides that Aukerman was seeking to enforce its patents
against all infringers and that, even though Chaides might be among the
smaller contractors, it had the same need for a license as larger firms. He
advised further that Aukerman would waive liability for past infringement
and infringement under existing contracts if Chaides took a license by June
1, 1979. Chaides responded in late April with a note handwritten on Aukerman's last letter stating that any responsibility was [the licensee's] and that,
if Aukerman wished to sue Chaides 'for $200-$300 a year,' Aukerman should
do so.
Id. at 1026-27.
80. Upon notification that Chaides was using the slip-form to a substantially
larger extent, Aukerman's counsel sent a correspondence to Chaides reaffirming the
position stated in 1979. The lack of response by Chaides resulted in Aukerman filing
suit in 1988. Id. at 1027.
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When Aukerman sued Chaides in 1988 for patent infringement,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chaides,
holding that laches and estoppel prohibited Aukerman's claim for
relief."' Although Aukerman was engaged in other litigation, the district
court did not acknowledge this as an adequate excuse because the other
litigation did not cover a seventeen month period during the delay
when Aukerman could have pursued Chaides..12 The district court
further held that Aukerman failed to give Chaides notice of any other
litigation then proceeding.8 3 The district court also rejected Aukerman's
due to Chaides' characterization
argument that the delay was reasonable
4
of de minimis infringement.1
Additionally, the district court held that Chaides had established
the defense of estoppel" and that neither the defense of laches nor
'8 6 Alestoppel was defeated by reason of Chaides' "unclean hands.
though Aukerman claimed that Chaides had made a copy of its patented
slip-form, the district court stated that Aukerman failed to provide
evidence of how the copy infringed the patent. 87 The court further
and
concluded that Chaides had been misled prior to using the copy
88
asserted.
defenses
equitable
the
defeat
not
did
conduct
its
that
B. THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE DEFENSES
1. Laches

In considering the doctrine of laches and the policy of fairness
that it represents, the Federal Circuit stated that "laches is cognizable
81. The district court ruled that Aukerman had the burden to prove the delay
was reasonable and not prejudicial to Chaides. Id.
82. Id. at 1027.
83. Id.

84. Id. The court found that Chaides would be prejudiced due to both economic
harm and evidentiary problems. Id.
85. The court found that Aukerman's silence for roughly 10 years was misleading,
constituting bad faith, and it should have notified Chaides of the result of the imposed
July 1, 1978 deadline. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d
1020, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Chaides detrimentally relied on Aukerman's silence by
underbidding contracts in lieu of bankruptcy. Id.
86. The court held that Aukerman had not presented sufficient evidence on how
a copy of the slip-form, produced by Chaides, infringed the patent. Id. The trial court
held that Chaides' conduct was not particularly egregious so as to disallow an equitable
defense. Id.; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (citing plagiarism as
egregious conduct).
87. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1027.
88. Id.
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under 35 U.S.C. § 2829 as an equitable defense to a claim of patent

infringement. " 9 Further, the court affirmatively rejected Aukerman's

assertion that a defense of laches conflicts with 35 U.S.C. § 28691 and

should therefore be inapplicable in patent infringement claims.92 Two

additional arguments made by Aukerman were also rejected: that laches
can only be applied to monetary awards resulting from an equitable
accounting, not to claims for damages, and that patent infringement is
a continuing tort immune from laches. 93 The court responded: "Aukerman's argument, which focuses on the acts of the defendant, distorts
the basic concept of laches. Laches focuses on the dilatory conduct of
the patentee and the prejudice which the patentee's delay has caused." 9
The Aukerman court elected not to modify the mechanical elements
of laches. The court then reaffirmed the two elements of laches which
must be proven by the defendant as: "1. the plaintiff delayed filing
suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from the time
the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its claim against
the defendant, and 2. the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of
the defendant." 95 The court held that laches is to be determined at the
89. § 282 reads in part: "The following shall be defenses in any action involving
the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringment,
absence of liability for infringement or unenforcability .

. . ."

35 U.S.C. .§282 (1988).

90. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028.
91. § 286 reads in part: "Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall
be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the
complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action." 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988).
92. "We are unpersuaded that section 286 should be interpreted to preclude the
defense of laches and provide, in effect, a guarantee of six years damages regardless
of equitable considerations arising from delay in assertion of one's rights." Aukerman,
960 F.2d at 1030-31.
The court went on to say:
Even looked at afresh, we have no difficulty in reading section 286 harmoniously with the recognition under section 282 of the laches defense. By section
286, Congress imposed an arbitrary limitation on the period for which damages
may be awarded on any claim for patent infringement. Laches, on the other
hand, invokes the discretionary power of the district court to limit the
defendant's liability for infringement by reason of the equities between the
particular parties .... An equitable defense under section 282 and the arbi-

Id.

trary limitation of section 286 do not conflict.
93. Id. at 1031-32.
94. Id.

95. Id. at 1032 (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961), Meyers v.
Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp.,
833 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). The court stated that "[tihe length of time which may
be deemed unreasonable has no fixed boundaries but rather depends on the circum-
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sound discretion of the trial court, and therefore must be flexible with
respect to the facts and circumstances of each case.96 To insure the
infringer was not treated unfairly by a delayed claim, the court must
balance "the length of delay, the seriousness of prejudice, the reasonableness of excuses, and the defendant's conduct or culpability." 97
Considering the presumption of laches, the court stated that
presumptions are based on "fairness, public policy, and probability." 98
The court held that a six-year delay in filing suit should remain the
standard for presuming the presence of laches. 99 Therefore, "a presumption of laches arises where a patentee delays bringing suit for
more than six years after the date the patentee knew or should have
known of the alleged infringer's activity."'0°
Although the elements of laches could naturally be inferred from
a lengthy delay, the existence of a presumption required that they be
inferred.101 It was with this application of the laches presumption that
the Aukerman court vigorously disagreed with precedent. Prior decisions involving presumptions in patent litigation had held that upon
the establishment of a six-year delay the burden of persuasion shifts to

stances." Id. Further, "[m]aterial prejudice to adverse parties

. . .

is essential to the

laches defense. Such prejudice may be either economic or evidentiary." Id. at 1033.
96. Id. at 1032.
97. Id. at 1034.
98. Id.; see also Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(stating that presumptions depend on fairness and public policy).
99. [The] practice of creating rebuttable presumptions using a statute of
limitations as a guide was extended to situations where the legal and equitable
claims were not the same but only analogous.
Courts faced with patent infringement actions 'borrowed' the six-year
damage limitation period in the patent statute now set out in section 286, as
the time period for giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of laches....
The presumption of laches arising from a more than six-year delay in
filing suit is consonant with the mainstream of the law. The length of the
time period-six years-is reasonable compared to the presumptions respecting
laches in other situations, which may be as short as one year.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1034-35 (citations ommitted).
100. Id. at 1028; see also id. at 1036-37 (comparing presumptions in patent
infringement cases and military pay cases).
101. By reason of the presumption, absent other equitable considerations, a
prima facie defense of laches is made out upon proof by the accused infringer
that the patentee delayed filing suit for six years after actual or constructive
knowledge of the defendant's acts of alleged infringement. Without the
presumption, the two facts of unreasonable delay and prejudice might reasonably be inferred from the length of the delay, but not necessarily. With the
presumption, these facts must be inferred, absent rebuttal evidence.
Id. at 1037.
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the patentee. 10 2 The court in Aukerman stated that "[tihis view of the
laches presumption is legally unsound."' 103
The court rejected the shifting of the "burden of persuasion,"
and adopted the procedure established in Rule 301 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 1°4 Rule 301 incorporates what is known as the "bursting
bubble" theory of presumptions.0 5 "If the patentee presents a sufficiency of evidence which, if believed, would preclude a directed finding
in favor of the infringer, the presumption evaporates and the accused
infringer is left to its proof.' °6 Consequently, the defendant loses the
benefit of a presumption and must satisfy its burden of persuasion
with actual evidence to invoke a defense of laches. Thus, merely the
burden of presenting evidence is placed on the plaintiff, while the
ultimate burden of persuasion always remains on the party asserting
the defense.
The court further stated that, "[o]nce a presumption of laches
arises, the patentee may offer proof directed to rebutting the laches
factors. Such evidence may be directed to showing either that the
patentee's delay was reasonable or that the defendant suffered no
prejudice or both."' 1 7 As a result, the court severely restricted the
effectiveness and efficiency of a presumption of laches.
102. Id.; see also Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 742 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
103. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1037.
104. Rule 301 "applies 'even if the common law presumption had been accorded
a greater weight in the past.' Id.
Rule 301 states:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the
sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon
the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EviD. 301.
105. Under this theory, a presumption is not merely rebuttable but completely
vanishes upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of
the nonexistence of the presumed fact .... In other words, the evidence must

be sufficient to put the existence of a presumed fact into genuine dispute. The
presumption compels the production of this minimum quantum of evidence
from the party against whom it operates, nothing more.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1037.
106. Id. at 1037-38.
107. Id. at 1038.
By raising a genuine issue respecting either factual element of a laches defense,
the presumption of laches is overcome.

Thus, the presumption of laches may be eliminated by offering evidence
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Estoppel

In patent litigation, the use of an equitable estoppel defense is
permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 282.10 8 However, the Aukerman court
specifically overruled the four element requirement for an estoppel
defense as outlined in Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton IndustrialProducts.'9

Unreasonable delay and prejudice are no longer required elements for

a defense of estoppel." 0 The court noted that the elements of laches
and estoppel are distinct from each other and should not be confused."'
To clarify the difference between the two defenses, the court announced
three elements which must be proven to preclude a suit using equitable
estoppel:
a. The patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged
infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend
to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer. "Conduct"
may include specific statements, action, inaction, or silence
where there was an obligation to speak.
b. The alleged infringer relies on that conduct.
c. Due to its reliance, the alleged infringer will be materially2
prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.1
to show an excuse for the delay or that the delay was reasonable, even if such
evidence may ultimately be rejected as not persuasive. Such evidence need
only be sufficient to raise a genuine issue respecting the reasonableness of the
delay to overcome the presumption....
A patentee may similarly eliminate the presumption with an offer of
evidence sufficient to place the matters of defense prejudice and economic
prejudice genuinely in issue. Thus, the patentee may eliminate the presumption
by offering proof that no additional prejudice occurred in the six-year time
period ....

... [Additionally], a patentee may be able to preclude application of the
laches defense with proof that the accused infringer was itself guilty of
misdeeds towards the patentee. This flows from the maxim, "He who seeks
equity must do equity."
Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 1028.
109. See supra note 62. "The test set out in Jamesbury confusingly intertwines
the elements of laches and equitable estoppel and is expressly overruled." Aukerman,
960 F.2d at 1042.
110. "Delay in filing suit may be evidence which influences the assessment of
whether the patentee's conduct is misleading but it is not a requirement of equitable
estoppel." Id.
111. Id.
112. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028.
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The court further held that despite a delay of six years, the laches
presumption is not applicable to a defense of estoppel. 1 3 Two primary

reasons were given for prohibiting the use of a presumption:

First, the presumed laches factors, that is, unreasonable and
inexcusable delay and prejudice resulting therefrom are not
elements of estoppel.

Second, the relief granted in estoppel is broader than in laches.
Because the whole suit may be barred

. .

the defendant should

carry a burden to establish the defense based on proof, not a
114
presumption.
Furthermore, the court stated that estoppel is not a rigid defense, that
is, all evidence regarding the equities of each party must be weighed

prior to the court's exercising its discretion in allowing a defense of
estoppel. "5 Thus, the court has removed the element of time and the
use of a presumption in what appears to be an effort to focus estoppel
on the equities of each parties actions.
C.

THE PRINCIPLES AT WORK

1. Laches

The Federal Circuit held that the ultimate burden of persuasion

had been placed on the patentee to negate the prima facie defense of
The first element of equitable estoppel concerns the statements or conduct
of the patentee which must "communicate something in a misleading way."
The "something"

. .

. is that the accused infringer will not be disturbed by

the plaintiff patentee in the activities in which the former is currently engaged.
The patentee's conduct must have supported an inference that the patentee
did not intend to press an infringement claim against the alleged infringer....
In the most common situation, the patentee specifically objects to the activities
currently asserted as infringement in the suit and then does not follow up for
years.

...

The second element, reliance, is not a requirement of laches but is
essential to equitable estoppel. The accusMd infringer must show that, in fact,
it substantially relied on the misleading conduct of the patentee in connection
with taking some action ....

To show reliance, the infringer must have had

a relationship or communication with the plaintiff which lulls the infringer
into a sense of security in going ahead with [expending capital] . ...
Finally, the accused infringer must establish that it would be materially
prejudiced if the patentee is now permitted to proceed. As with laches, the
prejudice may be a change of economic position or loss of evidence.
Id.at 1042-43 (citations omitted).
113. Id.at 1043.

114. Id. A defense of laches only precludes awarding damages prior to filing suit,
as compared to the complete bar available under an estoppel defense. Id. at 1028,
1039-41.
115. Id. at 1043.
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laches, and therefore the grant of summary judgment on the laches
defense was to be reversed. 11 6 Because Aukerman merely had to present
evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue regarding its conduct, its
involvement in other litigation during the delay should have destroyed
the presumption of laches." 7 The court held that in some cases, equity
may require notice of ongoing litigation; nevertheless, a notice requirement is not to be "rigidly" imposed." 8 Furthermore, the court concluded that the district court did not appropriately resolve Aukerman's
contention that Chaides' activities changed sufficiently to disrupt the
laches period." 9
2.

Estoppel

In applying the three element test for estoppel, the Aukerman
court determined that the district court erred in allowing a defense of
estoppel. 20 The court stated that the communications between the two
parties and the long silence by Aukerman could have led the defendant
to believe that Aukerman did not plan to enforce its rights., 21 Alternatively, the communications could have led the defendant to believe
Aukerman only waived an infringement claim for a $300 per year

116. Id. at 1039.
117. The district court stated it placed the "burden" on the patentee "of
showing [that its] delay was not unreasonable and inexcusable." This was a
greater burden than the patentee had to bear to overcome the presumption.
The patentee bears the burden only of coming forward with sufficient evidence
to raise a genuine factual issue respecting the reasonableness of its conduct
once the defendant shows delay in excess of six years.
Id. (citation omitted).
118. Id.
119. It is not disputed that defendant's conduct changed during the laches
time frame both by its manufacturing its own slip-forming device and by
greatly increasing the amount of asymmetrical wall it poured. It could not be
inferred against the patentee that these changed circumstances should have
been known to the patentee or were immaterial to the determination of laches.
Upon the record before us, summary judgment of laches was improperly
granted.
Id. (citation omitted).
120. We conclude that the elements supporting equitable estoppel were in
genuine dispute, that the evidence was not perceived in the light most favorable
to Aukerman, that inferences of fact were drawn against Aukerman and that
the entire issue must, in any event, be tried in light of the principles adopted
here.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1043.
121. Id. at 1044.
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license.' 22 The court held that these two possible different inferences
23
made summary judgment impermissible.
By concluding that there was a genuine issue regarding the first
element of estoppel, the court did not address the remaining elements.
Further, the court held that the alleged misconduct by Aukerman
should have been weighed prior to granting summary judgment.'2 4 The
following section analyzes the impact of the changes the Federal Circuit
made to both the use of a presumption in a laches defense and the
elements of an estoppel defense.
III.

POST-AUKERMAN EQUITABLE DEFENSES

A. LACHES

Although many defenses to patent infringement claims exist,' 25 the.
true strength of equitable defenses is their ability to dispose of cases
on summary judgment. 2 6 Further, the policy in establishing equitable
defenses is to prohibit a party from obtaining relief based upon its
improper action or lack of action. True equity should require the
plaintiff to bear the burden of persuading the court that a material
issue exists which requires a resolution by that court.
Barring claims involving unexplained lengthy delays fosters proper
and timely action by the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff is the only
party who possesses the information necessary to establish the timeliness
122. Properly focused, the issue here is whether Aukerman's course of conduct
reasonably gave rise to an inference in Chaides that Aukerman was not going

to enforce the '133 and '633 patents against Chaides ....
[S]ilence alone will
not create an estoppel unless there was a clear duty to speak, or somehow the
patentee's continued silence reenforces the defendant's inference from the
plaintiff's known acquiescence that the defendant will be unmolested....
... The length of the delay also favors drawing the inference [that
Aukerman waived his rights] because the longer the delay, the stronger the
inference becomes.
... Chaides' further statement that Aukerman would only recover $200$300 a year could lead one in Chaides' position to infer that Aukerman did
not sue because the amount in issue was de minimis ... At most Aukerman
could merely have been waiving an infringement claim for $300.00 per year.
Id. at 1043-44 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 1044.
124. Id.
125. For a list of major defenses see supra-note 6.
126. Robert H. Bell, Summary Judgment in the Federal Courts, 69 MIcH. B.J.
1038, 1038 (1990) ("No procedural bullet in the litigator's gun can be quite as effective
as a well-aimed motion for summary judgment.").
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of its conduct. However, Rule 301 127 allows only a shifting of the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut a presumption. This

process neither discourages the filing of improper claims nor encourages
timely conduct by the patent owner. When faced with potentially
devastating patent infringement litigation, the court should look with

greater scrutiny at the facts and allow the defendant greater avenues
of relief. 2 s Therefore, the presumption should compel the court to

require a significant level of rebuttal evidence from the plaintiff.

Aukerman, by rejecting prior decisions requiring a shifting of the
burden of persuasion, effectively eliminated the possibility of summary

judgment for an infringer based on laches. Although equitable defenses

are available during litigation, the effectiveness of these defenses is lost
under the Federal Circuit's formulation. 29 The denial of a summary
judgment motion leaves the defendant facing the potential loss of

tremendous economic resources during- and as a result of litigation.

The dilution of the summary judgment motion also places the patent

owner in a superior bargaining position as a consequence of its own
inequitable behavior. 30

127. See supra note 104 for the language of Rule 301.
128. A pro-infringer view is justified. The actions of the infringer are germane to
the application of equitable defenses and will be scrutinized by the court. Therefore, if
the reasonableness of the infringer's conduct is an issue, the patentee's conduct should
also be scrutinized. A patent owner should be required to show that it expelled a
reasonable effort to protect its rights prior to requesting the court to do so. At a
minimum the patentee should establish the infringer's conduct does not justify an
equitable defense. For a discussion of the scrutiny placed on the infringer's actions see
supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
129. The benefits of equitable defenses lose much of their bite during litigation.
Alternate defenses, which can result in the same disposition of the case, are available.
Multiple defenses help assure the desired result, but are not necessary if the alternative
defense is sufficient.
130. This can be explained by the pro-patent stance of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("CAFC"). The CAFC was created in 1982 to generate uniformity
in patent law. See Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal CourtsImprovement
Act: A Practitioner's Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 385, 387-88 (1984). The variations
in the interpretation of patent law prior to 1982 had led to forum shopping, discouraged
innovation, and made business planning difficult. Id. at 387. The creation of one court
with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals promotes a consistent interpretation of
the law. Id. The CAFC has proven itself to be pro-patent. From 1982 through 1987,
the CAFC upheld 89076 of the district court decisions finding a patent valid and reversed
45% of the decisions rejecting a patent. See Alexander E. Silverman, Comment,
Intellectual Property Law and the Venture Capital Process, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 157,
161-62 (1990). Pre-CAFC courts upheld only 30% to 40076 of the valid patent decisions.
Id. at 162. In addition, the CAFC recognizes as binding precedent the decisions of the
Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, two pro-patent courts.
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The ramifications of adopting a "bursting bubble" theory to patent
infringement claims, particularly in summary judgment motions, are
severe. The "bursting bubble" theory practically destroys the use of
summary judgment and gives the patentee an often unjustified superiority. 13' To better understand the aftermath of the Aukerman decision,
the following sections explain the policies behind Rule 56, the evolution
of Rule 301, and the application of other available defenses to patent
infringement.
1.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment can be granted under Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure when there is "no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.'

32

Two fundamental policies underlying summary judg-

ment are the avoidance of unnecessary litigation and the reduction of
harassing threats of litigation.' 33
A Rule 56 motion can be a drastic remedy, for it can end a cause
of action without a trial on the full merits of the case.'3 4 Consequently,
summary judgment has traditionally been granted cautiously.'35 How131. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
132. FED. R. Crv. P. 56. The relevant parts of Rule 56 dictate:
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law....

Id.

(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.... When
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial....

133. See Steven D. Smith, Comment, The Effect of Presumptionson Motions for
Summary Judgment in Federal Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1101, 1129 (1984); see also
10 CHARLEs A.

WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2712, at 564-67

(2d ed. 1983) ("[P]revent vexation and delay, improve the machinery of justice, promote
the expeditious disposition of cases and unnecessary trials . . ").
134. 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 2712, at 584-86.

135. See Smith, supra note 133, at 1114 (concluding that the policies behind Rules
56 and 301 conflict and therefore presumptions should not be allowed in motions for
summary judgment).
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ever, three decisions by the Supreme Court in the mid-1980s encouraged
liberal use of Rule 56 motions and established guidance for pretrial
136
dispositions.
The level of evidence needed to establish the existence or nonexistence of a genuine issue of fact was addressed by the Supreme Court
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 37 The Court stated that the
nonmoving party must present evidence showing reasonable potential
to meet its burden of proof at trial. 38 Consequently, when a defendant
asserts that the plaintiff has failed to provide a factual issue requiring
a trial, the plaintiff must then show facts have been presented which
could satisfy the required burden of proof. Similarly, if the defendant
bases a Rule 56 motion on an affirmative defense, the plaintiff must
provide facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. 39 These
standards apply equally to all areas of law, including patent cases.140
A motion for summary judgment, whether granted or denied,
influences the outcome of litigation. The disposition of a summary
judgment motion provides both parties an opportunity to make timely
business and litigation decisions.' 4' Further, a denied motion can often

136. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (holding that the moving
party need only assert the basis for summary judgment and the non-moving party has
the burden of proving a genuine issue exists); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (requiring the non-moving party to meet its burden of persuasion);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (requiring
claimant to present persuasive evidence to overcome summary judgment when the facts
fail to establish a likely claim).
137. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
138. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-53; see also The Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 133 F.R.D. 245,
314 (1990)[hereinafter Eighth Annual Judicial Conference](comments by Helen Nies,
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) ("The Supreme
Court said it was not enough just to put in some evidence on a particular fact. There
had to be enough evidence that you would send the case to a jury."); JAmEs FLEMING,
JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 207 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that prior to 1986 a 'genuine
issue of fact' was regarded as presented if there was the 'slightest doubt' as to what
the facts were").
139. A properly supported motion for summary judgment requires the non-moving
party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting FED. R. Clv. P. 56).
140. Eighth Annual Judicial Conference, supra note 138, at 315.
141. An early decision "helps your client make business decisions instead of sitting
around and waiting for years before it knows the outcome of the case." Id. at 306
(comments by Larry Hefter regarding the increased use of summary judgment motions
in trademark and unfair competition cases). The most obvious benefit of a summary
judgment motion is the reduction in litigation costs. Id.; see also supra notes 1-3.
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lead to settlements where the moving party is placed at a disadvantage,
4
while a granted motion can frustrate effective settlements. 1
A conflict between Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence occurs when the moving
party's motion is based on a presumption. Rule 56 was designed to
terminate litigation prior to trial and a "bursting bubble" theory of
Rule 301 results in extended litigation. In an effort to clarify this
contradiction, the following section analyzes the interrelationship of
these two rules.
2.

Rule 301 of the FederalRules of Evidence

Prior to the establishment of the Federal Rules of Evidence by
Congress, the Supreme Court considered and adopted a set of rules
for the federal courts. 43 Two primary theories regarding the effect that
a presumption should have upon the burden of proof were considered
by both the Court and Congress.'" The Court chose the Morgan
142. Denying summary judgment does not help bring cases to trial. "Since there
are no judges or court rooms to try those cases, they are often settled. The settlements
may have nothing to do with the merits of the case." Curtis E.A. Karnow, Follow the
Federal Lead on Summary Judgment, 9 CAL. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 67, 67 (discussing
California's reluctance to liberally grant summary judgment); cf. Eighth Annual Judicial
Conference, supra note 138, at 307 ("[A] psychological result frequently is that it
encourages the prevailing party that he has a good case and ...

thus making it harder

to settle.").
143. In March, 1965, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an Advisory
Committee to formulate rules of evidence for the federal courts. By order
entered on November 20, 1972, (Justice Douglas dissenting), the Supreme
Court prescribed federal rules of evidence, including rules governing presumpCongress promptly enacted Public
tions, to be effective July 1, 1973 ....
Law 93-12, deferring the effectiveness of the rules until expressly approved
by Congress. Congress then amended the proposed rules in various aspects
and enacted them into law.

Hugh J. Beard, Jr., Title VII and Rule 301: An Analysis of the Watson and Atonio

Decisions, 23 AKRON L. REv. 105, 116 (1989); see also Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926; Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 208 (1973).
144. The two theories of presumptions are best described as either the Thayer
model or the Morgan model. While both scholars spent much of their time debating
the evidentiary impact of presumptions neither approach has been accepted overwhelmingly over the other. For a basic understanding of the two views compare JAMES B.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 337 (1898) (shifting the burden of
production upon the establishment of presumption) with Edmund M. Morgan, Some
Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REv. 906 (1931) (shifting the
burden of persuasion).
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approach which shifts the burden of "persuasion" to the nonasserting
5
party. '

Congress, on the other hand, chose an approach similar to the

Thayer model which merely shifts the burden of "production. "146 Under
Congress' method, once a presumption is established, the opposing
party merely has to come forward with evidence to "rebut or meet the
presumption."'' 47 Thayer maintained that this evidence would have the
effect of destroying or "bursting the bubble" of presumption.'4 How-

ever, this approach treats a presumption as insignificant'4 9 in light of
the policy reasons for creating presumptions. 50
The Aukerman court concluded that, after much scholarly debate,
the Rule 301 "bursting bubble" theory represents the correct theory as

to presumptions.'

"Under this theory, a presumption is not merely

145. The Court's version of Rule 301 required the nonmoving party to prove the
nonexistence of the presumed fact was more probable than its existence. See THE
REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARy, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1973).
146. See supra note 104 for text of Rule 301; see also 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
301, at 301-1 to 301-14 (1992)
(providing a detailed account of the process followed in the development of 301); 21
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 5122, at 571-73 (stating that Rule 301 is a compromise
between the Morgan and Thayer approaches).
147. FED. R. EvID. 301; see also FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 19 (1984) (comments by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary).

148. Thayer advocated a 'bursting bubble' theory in which a presumption
vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which would support a finding of the
nonexistence of the presumed fact." Beard, supra note 143, at 118.
149. "Thayer's bursting bubble theory has been attacked for being as weak as the
metaphor which lends it a name. Some legal scholars maintain that the logic supporting

the bursting bubble theory pales in comparison to some of the reasons for creation of
a presumption .. " George Szary, Comment, The Treating Physician Rule.: Morgan

Presumption in Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income
Cases, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 303, 324 (1989-90) (citing Hinds v. John

Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 155 A.2d 721, 731 (1959)) ("[Ilt seems pointless to
create a presumption and endow it with coercive force, only to allow it to vanish in
the face of evidence of dubious weight or credibility."). "The Thayer-Wigmore view
has proved unacceptable because it is both arbitrary and unreasonable. Its unreason
consists in assigning so slight and evanescent procedural effect to every presumption."
Edmund M. Morgan & John M. Maguire, Looking Backwardand Forwardat Evidence,
50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 913 (1937).
150. See generally 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 146, 300[02], at 300-7 to

300-12. Presumptions originate out of fairness, public policy, and probability. A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(citing Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
151. For an explanation of the "bursting bubble" theory see supra note 148.
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rebuttable but completely vanishes upon the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed
fact.' ' 5 2 Therefore, if a patent infringer is successful in establishing
that the patentee delayed for at least six years, the elements of laches,
unreasonable delay and prejudice are presumed. The patentee can then
offer evidence to rebut either of the elements. 513 This evidence merely
54
needs to raise a genuine issue, even if it is ultimately "unpersuasive."1
The court held that rebutting either element would automatically burst
the other element, a so-called "double bursting bubble". 155
Aukerman articulated Rule 301 using a Thayer approach, but its
application of the rule is so poor it borders on nonexistent. Although
Rule 301 requires the patentee to rebut a presumption, the negligible
level of "rebuttal" evidence the court required to raise a "genuine
issue" is hardly sufficient to rebut such an important presumption.
to
Unless the reasons for allowing a presumption can be demonstrated
51 6
weight.
great
with
treated
be
should
presumption
a
be frivolous,
The Aukerman court merely required the patentee to show that it
was involved in other litigation during some of the delay. 57 Notice to
the infringer of either the litigation or the patentee's intent to enforce
its patent rights after the litigation was not required. 5 8 How can the
152. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1037. The Aukerman court appears to be somewhat
inconsistent with the drafters of Rule 301. Although the text of Rule 301 and the
Congressional debates surrounding it substantiate that Rule 301 does treat a presumption
as rebuttable and only shifts the burden to rebut, they do not state that the presumption
vanishes. Under the House version of Rule 301, "even though met with contradicting
evidence, a presumption is sufficient evidence of the fact presumed, to be considered
by the trier of fact." 120 CONG. REc. 2370 (1974). This is neither a Thayer nor a
Morgan approach, it "takes sort of a middle road." 120 CONG. REc. 1419 (1974)
(statements of Rep. Dennis). "[A] presumption, while it need not be followed, stays in
the case and is sufficient to justify the trier of the facts so finding; it will take the case
to the jury." Id. This part of the House version, which treated a presumption as
evidence, was rejected by the Senate. However, the approved Senate version still allows
the court to "instruct the jury that they may infer the existence of the presumed fact."
S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1974). By allowing this inference, it is clear

that Rule 301 was not intended to award rebuttal evidence the power to destroy a
presumption. See also supra note 148.
153. "By raising a genuine issue respecting either factual element of a laches
defense, the presumption of laches is overcome." Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038.

154. Id.
155. Id. at 1038; see also id. at 1046 (Plager, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part).
152.

156. However, a presumption is not evidence. Id. at 1037; see also supra note
157. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039.
158. "[T]here can be no rigid requirement in judging a laches defense that ...

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 13

mere presence of other litigation rebut the presumption of an unexcused
delay? Would the existence of other litigation truly raise a genuine
issue of fact, regarding the excusableness of the delay, for which
reasonable persons could differ?' 9
The court's ruling results in the virtual loss of presumed laches as
a basis for summary judgment. 160 Without the availability of a presumption, the infringer will have to persuade the court that both the
time delay was unreasonable and that it was prejudiced by the delay.
Consequently, the infringer will have to affirm tively prove the patentee
lacks an adequate excuse. This would be difficult to do, as the facts
needed to prove the nonexistence of an excuse are not typically within
the infringer's control.
Patent litigation is a highly expensive, time consuming process. 16'
A patentee dares not venture this path unless the potential rewards are
both probable and profitable. The chances are remote that a patentee
will prosecute a patent claim against an infringer until litigation would
be monetarily ripe.' 62 Therefore, under Aukerman, a patentee can sue
Infringer A and ignore Infringer B until B has significantly infringed
or become fiscally reliant on infringing the patent. Suing infringer A
will allow the patentee to confirm the validity of its patent and bestow
upon it escalated rewards by delaying suit against B, without fear of
losing a summary judgment motion. 63 Winning a pretrial motion will
notice must be given ....Where there is prior contact, the overall equities may require
appropriate notice ... [but] a notice requirement is not to be rigidly imposed ....
.
Id.

159. Bell, supra note 126, at 1040 ("If reasonable minds can differ as to the
import or interpretation of the evidence then the motion will be denied.").
160. "No lawyer who reads carefully the court's instructions in this case, and who
has even a remotely respectable case, should have any difficulty in creating the factual
showing that will cause both parts of the presumption to 'burst."' Aukerman, 960
F.2d at 1047 (Plager, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). At least one writer
believes "the presumption itself might raise a genuine issue of material fact .... The

absence of direct proof on the matter at issue [unreasonable delay and prejudice] raises
the strong possibility that a factual dispute does exist and that the case should therefore
go to a jury." Smith, supra note 133, at 1131.
161. For some examples of the high cost of litigation see supra notes 1-3.
162. Waiting until litigation is ripe can be an acceptable excuse, provided the
patentee notifies the infringer of its intentions. See supra note 52 (explaining that
nonmonetarily ripe litigation can be an acceptable excuse).
163. Such unsavory practice could provide the infringer an "unclean hands"
%defensebased on the patentee's actions. However, the "unclean hands" defense has
traditionally been applied in two circumstances: fraudulent procurement of the patent
and misuse of the patent involved in the suit. See Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier
Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 186 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that transgressions of equitable
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undoubtedly give the patent holder a valuable negotiation tool if an
alternative resolution is sought.,61
Such unjust benefits squarely conflict with the notion of fairness
inherent in the doctrines of equity. Moreover, the new standards for
presumptions fail to provide any additional protection for responsible
plaintiffs. An evaluation of the remedies available which reduce or
eliminate the liability of an accused patent infringer, will reveal the
true uselessness of a laches defense after the Aukerman decision.
3.

Defenses and Remedies

Because laches bars only pre-filing damages and 35 U.S.C. § 286
limits damages to a maximum of six years prior to filing,' 65 a six-year
period of potential damages exists which the defendant must address.
The amount of damages which can be recovered with respect to the
six-year period will depend upon which defenses the defendant can
establish.

66

Additionally and most importantly for this comment, if a patent
owner failed to adequately mark its product, as required by 35 U.S.C.
standards by a patentee have been applied uniformly to claims of fraud and inequitable
conduct), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977); see also Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 456 F.2d 592, 595 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972) ("[A] patentee guilty of obtaining a patent
by fraudulent conduct [can] be denied equitable relief when bringing an infringement
action . . . ."), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1974). Further, to establish a defense based
on the inequitable conduct of the opposing party, deliberate, calculated intent must be
established. "IT]he misconduct~must be accompanied by 'some element of wrongfulness,
willfulness, or bad faith."' Pfizer, 538 F.2d at 186 (quoting Parker v. Motorola, Inc.,
524 F.2d 518, 535 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976)). The process of
proving the patentee set out to escalate damages through an extended delay will
invariably present genuine issues of fact. Thus, the patentee still survives a summary
judgment.
164. Sustaining one substantial loss during pre-trial motions will make any infringer
reconsider the cost of submitting to the patent owner's demands against the cost of
losing an expensive litigation. Unjustified and exorbitant demands may appear attractive
to a weary infringer. See supra note 141 (stating the affects a summary judgment
motion has on decision-making).
165. For the text of 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988) see supra note 91.
166. The available defenses to patent infringement are too numerous to be
discussed in detail in this article. See generally 5 CmstuM, supra note 6, § 19.01
(presenting many available defenses). While some defenses bar all liability, others
merely reduce liability. Id. at 19-4 to 19-5. However, most patent infringement defenses
require extensive litigation before a trier of fact and therefore, would not be practical
for a Rule 56 motion. Although these defenses may ultimately bar any recovery by the
patent owner, they pale in comparison to the effect summary judgment has in reducing
the expense and time expended to defend against a claim.
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§ 287, no damages will be awarded prior to notification of infringement. 167 Therefore, if the patent owner did not abide by the statute in
"notifying the public," the defendant will not be liable for any prefiling damages regardless of the defense used. A motion for summary
judgment based on a failure to mark will therefore have the same result
on a damages remedy as a laches defense. Consequently, laches is only
economically useful where the plaintiff marked its product, never
attempted to sell its product, or had a process patent.' 61
Furthermore, if the infringed patent involves a process, the patent
owner will probably have a very strong excuse for the delay. While
patent infringements of a physical attribute are readily discoverable
when openly infringed, the infringement of unique processes used to
produce a product are not always obvious, even where the final product
is publicly displayed. Therefore, even with a burden of persuasion, the
patentee can show that knowledge of an infringed process patent was
not available more than six years prior to filing.
Similarly, because a patent owner is only required to use reasonable
diligence to discover infringements of its patent, it has the ability to
excuse the delay merely by showing that a defendant did not openly
infringe the patent and notice of infringement could not be ascertained.
These defenses were available prior to Aukerman and, therefore,
removing the burden of persuasion from the patentee provides no
additional protection for process patents and concealed infringement.
If the patent owner truly did not know of the infringement, 69 it has

167. § 287 says in part:

Patentees ...

may give notice to the public that [an article] is patented, either

by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together
with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article,
this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more
of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. In the event of failure
so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for
infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be
recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.

35 U.S.C. § 287 (1988).

168. An infringer cannot rely on a failure to mark defense, if the patentee never
sold a product covered by the patent. See Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Ry.
Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387 (1936) (holding that a patentee does not have a duty to mark
if it never made or sold a product covered by the patent). Further, there is no duty to
mark a process patent. See Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1983); see also 5 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 20.03[7][c], at 20-249 to 20-258.
169. For a discussion of the of knowledge required by the patentee see supra notes
46-48 and accompanying text.
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nothing to fear from the assertion of laches, even if it bears the burden
of persuasion.
While the Aukerman decision fails to provide additional protection
for conscientious plaintiffs, it does provide an opportunity for reward
of questionable business practices and virtually eliminates the only
opportunity a defendant had to limit expenditures through a summary
judgment motion. For example, a patent owner who properly marks
its product can knowingly and silently allow an infringement to continue. After allowing the infringer to establish a market and fiscal
reliance on infringing the patent, the patent owner can file suit without
fear of an equitable laches defense. 170 To avoid a summary judgment
motion, the patent owner merely has to generate the negligible level of
"rebuttal" evidence required by Aukerman. This type of abuse can
also happen where a patentee, such as a large corporation, creates a
substantial patent portfolio and asserts its exclusive rights only after
allowing substantial infringement to occur.
When an infringer is on notice of both the existence of a patent
and the patentee's intent to enforce it, equitable laches will not bar a
claim.1 71 Therefore, a patent owner is not guilty of inequitable conduct
when it puts the world on notice of its patent and diligently enforces
its claims when it is aware they exist. While a patentee is not required
to pursue legal action against an infringer, it should be required to
clearly notify the infringer of its intention to enforce its rights. The
patentee need only fear a defense of estoppel when its notification or
conduct leads the infringer to believe that it did not truly intend to
enforce its rights. 12 Although the requirement to notify known infringers may be somewhat burdensome, the burden is justified by eliminating
the threat of unethical and abusive use of patents.
4.

One Possible Resolution

The court can adopt the "bursting bubble" view of Rule 301 as it
felt compelled to do in Aukerman, without completely diluting the
effectiveness of laches in a summary judgment motion. Rule 301 does
170. Although Aukerman states that a patentee cannot "intentionally lie silently
in wait watching damages escalate," this is precisely what the lower standard will
promote. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
171. To understand the impact of notice see supra note 45 and accompanying
text.
172. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (stating the elements of
estoppel).
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not specify the level of evidence needed to rebut a presumption.' 3
Therefore, the court has the discretionary power to hold the patentee
responsible for producing a significant level of evidence in order to
rebut the presumption. The Aukerman decision actually lowers the
amount of evidence needed to rebut a presumption below that required
to overcome a motion for summary judgment. 7 4 The level of evidence
required by Aukerman more closely resembles the pre-1986 requisite of
a "slightest doubt," than it does the "reasonable potential" required
for summary judgment today.'75
A recent sequence of cases involving an individual inventor, Harold
S. Hemstreet, highlights the weakness in the Aukerman decision. 7 6
Hemstreet owned two patents issued in 1976. From 1976 to 1989 he
was involved in various litigation enforcing his patent rights. 77 The
validity of the patents was in dispute between 1986 and 1989 until a
re-examination proceeding upheld the patents. 7 In 1983, Hemstreet
notified numerous infringers by letter requesting negotiations and explaining the ongoing litigation.'1 9 No further communication existed
between Hemstreet and some of the infringers until more than six years
had past.'8 0 In all three cases the trial court's order granting summary
judgment for the infringer was reversed based on the Aukerman
decision. "'
Although, the evidence Hemstreet presented clearly met the lenient
requirements set forth in Aukerman, the decisions would be the same
under an elevated burden of presentation. This highlights the fact that
a reduction in the burden of proof was not needed. The notification
Hemstreet provided when the infringements were discovered, as well as
173. Rule 301 merely states that the nonasserting party bears "the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption .... ." FED. R. Evm. 301.
174. For an explanation of the evidence required to overcome summary judgment
see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (explaining the old evidentiary
requirements for summary judgment).
176. Hemstreet v. Banctec, Inc., No. 91-1089, 1992 WL 196746 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
14, 1992); Hemstreet v. Lundy Electronics & Sys., Inc., No. 90-1486, 1992 WL 196745
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 1992); Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
177. Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d at 1291-92.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1292.
180. Id.
181. Hemstreet v. Banctec, Inc., 1992 WL 196746 at *1; Hemstreet v. Lundy
Electronics & Sys., Inc., 1992 WL 196745 at *1; Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys.
Corp., 972 F.2d at 1295.
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the re-examination proceedings, would clearly meet a standard requiring
a significantly higher level of evidence. While Hemstreet's evidence
would have been sufficient under either level, the plethora of acceptable
excuses for long delays, under the low Aukerman standard, but not
under an elevated standard, are distressing." 2
The safeguards established in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide ample protection for patent owners who truly did not sleep on
their claims.' 3 For that reason, the court should raise the level of
evidence sufficient to rebut a laches presumption to that required by
Rule 56.
B.

ESTOPPEL

While the Aukerman decision is detrimental to the infringer who
asserts a laches defense, it provides some relief for infringers by
reducing the elements previously required for an estoppel defense. By
eliminating the element of time previously required for equitable estoppel, the court properly focuses estoppel on the conduct of the patentee.
The element of delay, as used in Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Industrial
Products,'84 had no logical relationship to the infringer's reliance placed
upon prior communication by the patent owner. Further, by removing
the elements of laches from estoppel, the availability of, and confusion
surrounding, presumptions have been eliminated." 5
An unreasonable time, as required prior to Aukerman, usually
required a delay of a number of years. 8 6 With the need for an
182. A patentee's negotiations with its own attorneys would clearly not be sufficient
to excuse a delay under a higher standard, but might be sufficient to excuse a lengthy
delay under Aukerman. See Meyers v. Asics Corp., Nos. 90-1305, 91-1307 and 911308, 1992 WL 213081 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 1992). Although the delay was less than six
years, the court held that the delay was not unreasonable. The patentee's excuse of
negotiating with its attorneys and other parties was sufficient to reverse summary
judgment based on laches. Id. at *3.
183. "The burden on the nonmoving party is not a heavy one; he simply is
required to show specific facts, as opposed to general allegations, that present a genuine
issue worthy of trial." See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 2727, at 148. In
addition, "evidence in opposition to the motion that clearly is without any force is
insufficient to raise a genuine issue." Id. § 2727, at 165.
184. 839 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
185. "Because the whole suit may be barred, we conclude that the defendant
should carry a burden to establish the defense based on proof, not a presumption."
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1043 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
186. See Advanced Hydraulics, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 525 F.2d 477 (7th Cir.)
(five years), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 869 (1975); Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco,
Inc., 464 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1972) (three years).
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unreasonable delay abolished, estoppel can conceivably be established
in a matter of months. However, Aukerman states that the infringer
"must know or reasonably be able to infer that the patentee has known
of the former's activities for some time."' 87 Nevertheless, this requirement appears to be applicable only where the patentee objects to the
infringer's activities and fails to follow-up in a timely manner. 8'
For an estoppel defense the infringer must prove it reasonably
relied upon plaintiff's action to its detriment. 8 9 The 'quantity of detriment that was needed to justify denying the patentee any infringement
claim was meaningless prior to Aukerman. This is based on the premise
that if the patentee had delayed for an unreasonable time while the
infringer relied on its conduct, the infringer's detriment would be

extensive and easy to establish.' 90 However, the Aukerman court failed
to establish clear guidelines to follow. Consequently, if a patent owner

makes misleading comments and based upon these statements . the
defendant lnyests in a facility to produce the infringing product, 9
arguably estoppel can be granted even if the suit was filed prior to the
manufacture of any product. 92 Under the pre-Aukerman requirements,
an infringer who moves swiftly in reliance on the patentee's conduct
187. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1042 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
188. Id.

189. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for the elements required for
estoppel. In some cases a long silence by the patentee can lead the infringer to infer
that the patentee does not intend to enforce its rights. "[S]ilence alone will not create
an estoppel unless there was a clear duty to speak, or somehow the patentee's continued
silence reenforces the defendant's inference from the plaintiff's known acquiescence
that the defendant will be unmolested." A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const.
Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1043-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). However, "on summary
judgment, such inference must be the only possible inference from the evidence." Id.
at 1044.
190. An infringer would clearly make some business decisions during a six-year
delay which could be considered detrimental if the continued use of the infringed patent
was denied.
191. An infringer can build a plant being entirely unaware of the patent. As
a result of infringement, the infringer may be unable to use the facility.
Although harmed, the infringer could not show reliance on the patentee's
conduct. To show reliance, the infringer must have had a relationship or
communication with the plaintiff which lulls the infringer into a sense of
security in going ahead with building the plant.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1043.
192. The court did emphasize that even where the elements of estoppel are
established the equity of barring the suit must be considered. Id. As a result, the court
may view the lack of a lengthy delay as unequitable for the patentee. Therefore, the
removal of the time element may have little impact in application.
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would probably fail to establish an estoppel defense. Conversely, the
same infringer will probably have a defense of estoppel, under Aukerman.
The new elements set forth in Aukerman may reduce the amount
of unnecessary litigation and the economic impact on all parties because
a defense of estoppel will now be easier to establish on summary
judgment. 93 Further, unless the infringer knew of circumstances which
would influence the reasonableness of its reliance, the excuses available
to overcome the unreasonable delay element of laches are no longer
useful in an estoppel defense. 194
CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in A. C. Aukerman
Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., applied Rule 301 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to presumptions of laches in patent infringement
litigation. The court's interpretation of Rule 301 effectively eliminates
the use of presumptions in a motion for summary judgment. The
change in the court's direction fails to provide any additional protection
to patent owners, but does encourage inequitable conduct which borders
on deception. By eliminating the pre-litigation usefulness of equitable
defenses, the court has provided the patentee an unjustifiably superior
position in settlement negotiations.
The court should reconsider the level of rebuttal evidence needed
to overcome a presumption and establish a much higher standard than
that used in Aukerman. A higher standard keeps the ultimate burden
of proof on the infringer and discourages inappropriate conduct by the
patentee.
The removal of a time element in a defense of estoppel properly
places the emphasis on the patentee's conduct. The court's holding will
discourage misleading conduct by patent owners and provide the defendant with greater protection.
RUSSELL

D.

SLIFER

193. Equitable estoppel may be determined on summary judgment. Id. However,
if the infringer inferred from the patentee's conduct that it would be unmolested, such
inference must be the only possible inference from the evidence. Id. at 1043-44. Further,
the court will still highly scrutinize any motion for summary judgment, as it did prior
to Aukerman. See supra notes 133-35 (stating that summary judgment motions are
granted cautiously). Therefore, if the plaintiff can establish a genuine issue, summary
judgment will not be granted.
194. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1044.

